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NOTES TO BOOK V.

Note A, page 376.

OF all our treaties with foreign nations, there is none so credit- able to English negotiation as the treaty of Utrecht. This cele- brated treaty was managed and concluded by the more celebrated Lord Bolingbroke; and, with whatever blemishes either justice or malice may have shaded his character, never did any minister secure more effectually the interests and honour of his country, or at so little cost.

The treaty of 17 63, which secured Cape Breton, St John's Island, and Canada, to England, was also glorious, in respect to the ter— ritories it added to the British empire; but these acquisitions were previously secured by the power of our naval and military forces.

How different will both everlastingly appear in history to the treaty of Paris, (1814,) when our ministers might have dictated any stipulation they pleased, without violating British honour, or inter- national justice! But let us ask how the ratification of that treaty was managed? The observation made to me by a distinguished American statesman and philosopher, whom I met in Canada, may perhaps supply an answer. We were conversing on the relations of Great Britain with Europe and America, and particularly on the arrangements agreed to by the treaty of Paris. “ Sir,” said he, “a treaty is an agreement between two or more nations, with various stipulations, provisoes, and considerations. It is, in fact, a bargain, in which something is, or has been given, and something has been, or is received in return. Now, sir, let me ask you, What has your country received as an equivalent for what she has spent for, or given to foreign states? What did you receive from France for the blood and treasure you wasted on her account? Why did you not at least retain her West India islands, and the Isle of Bour-